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FORUM NON CONVENIENS, AND THE PROBLEM
OF Ex ANTE INADEQUACY
Howard M. Erichson*
The headline and story leave no doubt about Chevron's preference for
United States courts over Ecuador's courts:
PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS FORUM SHOP FRAUDULENT JUDGMENT; AVOID UNITED
STATES
The Ecuador judgment is a product of bribery, fraud, and it is illegitimate.
Chevron does not believe that the Ecuador judgment is enforceable in any
court that observes the rule of law.
If the plaintiffs' lawyers believed in the integrity of their judgment, they
would be seeking enforcement in the United States where Chevron
Corporation resides.
These opening lines from Chevron's website of "facts about Chevron and
Texaco in Ecuador" refer to the latest salvo in a long-running environmental
dispute concerning a Texaco subsidiary's Ecuadorian oil-drilling activities.
Chevron resisted enforcement in the United States of an Ecuadorian court's $18
billion judgment, and the plaintiffs are seeking to enforce the judgment against
2Chevron in various courts around the world. Chevron's account suggests that
the plaintiffs' lawyers are engaged in improper forum-shopping. The plaintiffs'
lawyers, according to Chevron, ought to pursue enforcement of the judgment in
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law. The author thanks Marc Arkin and
Benjamin Zipursky for their comments, the participants in the Stanford Journal of Complex
Litigation Symposium for their questions and suggestions, and Alexander Wentworth-Ping
for his research assistance.
1. CHEVRON, ECUADOR LAWSUIT: FACTS ABOUT CHEVRON AND TEXACO IN ECUADOR,
http://www.chevron.com/ecuador/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
2. The plaintiffs have brought enforcement proceedings in at least Canada,
Argentina, Colombia, and Brazil. See Jeff Gray, Chevron Touts a Win in Ecuador Dispute,
TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 9, 2013, at B5; Jeff Gray, Chevron, Ecuadorans to Clash in
Toronto Court, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 26, 2012, at B2; Emily Schmall, Argentina:
Chevron's Assets are Frozen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at A9.
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the United States. 3
The irony is almost too much to bear. At the outset of the litigation nearly
twenty years ago, the plaintiffs' lawyers sued in the United States. They
brought a class action in the Southern District of New York on behalf of 30,000
inhabitants of the Oriente region of Ecuador. 4 The plaintiffs' lawyers elected to
pursue litigation in the United States rather than in Ecuador apparently because
they preferred the advantages of the United States judicial system and because
they lacked confidence that they could get a fair hearing in Ecuador.5 The
plaintiffs contended that the courts of Ecuador "are subject to corrupt
influences and are incapable of acting impartially." 6 Investigative journalist
Patrick Radden Keefe, in a New Yorker story about attorney Steven Donziger's
role in the Ecuador litigation (reprinted in this Issue), described the plaintiffs'
lawyers' worries about corruption in the Ecuador courts: "For eight years,
Texaco fought to have the lawsuit dismissed, on the ground that it should be
tried not in the U.S. but in Ecuador. Donziger and his colleagues feared such a
turn: Ecuador's judicial system was notoriously corrupt, and its government
relied on oil revenues for a third of its annual budget."
7
While the plaintiffs sought to litigate in the United States, Texaco insisted
that the dispute ought to be litigated in Ecuador. Seeking dismissal on grounds
of forum non conveniens and international comity, Texaco argued that
"Ecuador's sovereign interests make Ecuador the most appropriate forum for
plaintiffs to pursue their claims against all interested parties." 8 In its brief
supporting its motion to dismiss, Texaco emphasized Ecuador's sovereign
interests in the dispute: "Those interests include the right to enact laws and
establish policies relating to its oil fields, lands, economy, and environmental
priorities. Like all nations, Ecuador sets the scope, pace, and standards of
development within its borders, and it chooses its priorities in doing so."
9
According to Texaco, "Ecuador's interests are obvious and substantial because
3. ECUADOR LAWSUIT, supra note 1.
4. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002) ("In November
1993, Ecuadorian plaintiffs filed the first of two class action lawsuits against Texaco in the
Southern District of New York on behalf of some 30,000 inhabitants of the Oriente
region.").
5. Id. at 477-78 (noting plaintiffs' arguments "that Ecuadorian courts are unreceptive
to tort claims," "that Ecuadorian courts do not recognize class actions," and "that Ecuadorian
courts are subject to corrupt influences and are incapable of acting impartially").
6. Id. at 478.
7. Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune: The Lago Agrio Litigation, 1 STAN. J.
COMPLEX LiTIG. 199 (2013) (reprinting Keefe's article, Reversal of Fortune, which appeared
in the New Yorker on January 9, 2012).
8. Texaco Inc.'s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Renewed Motions to Dismiss
Based on Forum Non Conveniens and International Comity at 10, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,
No. 93 Civ. 7527 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1999).
9. Id.
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plaintiffs' claims concern that nation's lands, people, environment, laws,
national oil company, and its oil field practices today."' 10 Describing in detail
Ecuador's court system and litigation procedures, Texaco argued that
"Ecuador's judicial system provides a fair and adequate alternative forum."11 In
response to plaintiffs' questions about the fairness and impartiality of
Ecuador's courts, Texaco argued on appeal that "Ecuador can and does
dispense independent and impartial justice." 12
There is nothing quite like a multi-billion dollar judgment to alter parties'
views on the relative merits of judicial systems. On the plaintiffs' side, the
lawyers' earlier effort to avoid Ecuador's courts gave way to efforts to enforce
the Ecuador judgment. On the defense side, Texaco's effort to avoid United
States courts, and its insistence that the dispute must be litigated in Ecuador,
gave way to Chevron's 13 efforts to use United States courts to declare the
Ecuador judgment unenforceable. When the Ecuadorian court issued its
judgment, Chevron swiftly condemned the ruling: "The Ecuadorian court's
judgment is illegitimate and unenforceable. It is the product of fraud and is
contrary to the legitimate scientific evidence.... Chevron does not believe that
today's judgment is enforceable in any court that observes the rule of law."'14
Flip-flopping is not necessarily hypocrisy, nor does it indicate bad
lawyering. At the outset, it made strategic sense for the plaintiffs to initiate the
litigation in the United States, just as it made sense for the defendants to argue
that the litigation belonged in Ecuador. For the plaintiffs, United States courts
beckoned for all the usual reasons why plaintiffs often favor the United States -
10. Id. at43.
11. Id. at 18. See also id. at 18-21 (describing Ecuador's judicial system); 25-30
(arguing that Ecuador constitutes an "adequate alternative forum" for purposes of forum non
conveniens).
12. Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens
and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1447 (2011) (quoting
Appellee's Brief at 54-56, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002)).
13. In 2001, Chevron and Texaco merged, becoming the ChevronTexaco Corporation,
which several years later changed its name to Chevron Corporation. In the litigation between
Chevron and plaintiffs' attorney Steven Donziger over the handling of the Ecuador lawsuit,
the court noted that "[u]nder the terms of the Merger Agreement, Chevron became the owner
of all of Texaco's common stock but did not acquire any of Texaco's assets or liabilities."
Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 886 F. Supp. 2d 235, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Section 1.2 of
the Merger Agreement). The original litigation was filed in United States courts against
Texaco, but the lawsuit in Ecuador was filed against Chevron, and it is Chevron that was hit
with the multi-billion dollar judgment. For purposes of understanding the challenges of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens challenges that can arise in other cases uncomplicated
by mergers or other entity variations it makes sense to think of the forum arguments in this
litigation as an extended set of arguments by the defending parties.
14. Press Release, Illegitimate Judgment Against Chevron in Ecuador Lawsuit (Feb.
14, 2011),
http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/0214201 l-illegitimatejudgmentagain
stchevroninecuadorlawsuit.news (visited Dec. 17, 2012).
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jury trials, class actions, liberal discovery, contingent fees, and punitive
damages. Despite recent decisions disfavoring plaintiffs on such topics as
pleadings, 15 summary judgment, 16 class actions, 17 personal jurisdiction, 18 and
punitive damages, 19 United States courts remain quite attractive to plaintiffs in
civil proceedings. 20 In addition, concerns about corruption in Ecuador weighed
against suing in an Ecuadorian forum, given the country's oil-dependence and
the defendants' superior resources. 2 1 For many of the same reasons concerning
the plaintiff advantages of United States litigation, the defendants
understandably sought dismissal of the United States lawsuit and touted the
logic of shifting the dispute to an Ecuadorian forum. For companies sued in the
United States by foreigners for foreign injuries, the motion to dismiss on
grounds of forum non conveniens is practically a knee-jerk reaction. 22 There is
15. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007).
16. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
17. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S.
Ct. 2541 (2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
18. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); J.
McIntyre Mach. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
19. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
20. See Lory Barsdate Easton, Getting Out of Dodge: Defense Pointers on
Jurisdictional Issues in Aviation Torts Litigation, 20 Air & Space L. 3, 9 (2006) (describing
advantages for foreign plaintiffs suing in the United States, relative to suing in other
countries, including higher damages awards, jury trial, pretrial discovery, strict liability,
contingent fees, and the American rule on legal fees); Nicholas A. Fromherz, A Call for
Stricter Appellate Review of Decisions on Forum Non Conveniens, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUDIES L. REv. 527, 529 (2012) ("For a number of reasons, foreign plaintiffs want their
cases heard in U.S. courts and, perhaps counter-intuitively, U.S. defendants prefer to resolve
matters elsewhere. In fact, the draw to litigate in the United States is so powerful, and the
consequences so high, that the issue of location frequently overshadows the merits.").
21. See Keefe, supra note 7.
22. See Easton, supra note 20, at 9-10. Defendants move for dismissal under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens not only because they prefer a foreign forum, but also
because they often expect that the case will never be refiled and thus that the dismissal will
prove outcome-determinative. Nicholas Fromherz makes the point that a forum non
conveniens dismissal likely rings the death knell for a lawsuit. See Fromherz, supra note 20,
at 543-46; see generally David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and
England: "A Rather Fantastic Fiction," 103 L.Q. REV. 398 (1987). Thus, the doctrine may
be seen not simply as a forum-selection doctrine, but as a tool for escaping liability. See
Fromherz, supra note 20, at 541 ("'Critics of the forum non conveniens doctrine charge that
it is used by U.S. corporations as a tool to escape liability when they are sued in U.S. courts
for injuries caused [abroad].' After looking past all of the legal jargon, it is hard to
disagree.") (quoting RONALD A. BRAND & SCOTT R. JABLONSKI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS:
HISTORY, GLOBAL PRACTICE, AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF
COURT AGREEMENTS 129 (2007)). In this regard, one of the unusual features of the Chevron-
Ecuador story is that the plaintiffs successfully pursued their claims in the foreign tribunal
after the United States dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens.
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no reason to think that either the plaintiffs or the defendants were misguided in
their strategic assessment of the potential forums at the outset. But later, when
the Ecuadorian courts had entered and affirmed a plaintiff judgment amid
questions about the integrity of the process, the strategic circumstances
obviously had changed.
The massive judgment turned this into a story of "Be careful what you
wish for." The defendants successfully demanded that the dispute be litigated in
Ecuador rather than the United States, but they did not like the way it turned
out. As Michael Goldhaber aptly put it, the defendants experienced "forum
shopper's remorse.
' 23
The Chevron flip-flop on forum preference highlights the difficulty of the
prediction at the core of forum non conveniens analysis. It is not only that the
parties must predict where they would be better off. It is also that the judge
must predict how the matter would be handled if it were refiled in the foreign
jurisdiction. When a court grants a motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non
conveniens, it must find that there is an adequate alternative forum. The
Supreme Court laid out this principle in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert: "In all cases
in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into play, it presupposes
at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process." 24 The
Court spelled out the requirement more clearly in footnote 22 of Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno:
At the outset of anyJbrum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine
whether there exists an alternative forum. Ordinarily, this requirement will be
satisfied when the defendant is 'amenable to process' in the other jurisdiction.
In rare circumstances, however, where the remedy offered by the other forum
is clearly unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an adequate alternative,
and the initial requirement may not be satisfied. Thus, for example, dismissal
would not be appropriate where the alternative forum does not permit
litigation of the subject matter of the dispute.25
In light of the Chevron litigation, it is interesting to note that in the Piper
Aircraft footnote, the Supreme Court's single example of an inadequate forum
was Ecuador.
26
Indeed, by some indicia, Ecuador seems a prime candidate for a finding of
inadequacy for purposes of forum non conveniens. In Michael Lii's empirical
23. Michael D. Goldhaber, Forum Shopper's Remorse, CORP. COUNSEL, Apr. 2010, at
63. See also Whytock & Robertson, supra note 12, at 1447.
24. GulfOil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947).
25. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 n.22 (1981) (citing Gilbert, 330
U.S. at 506-507).
26. The Court cited Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445 (D. Del.
1978), with the following parenthetical: "court refuses to dismiss, where alternative forum is
Ecuador, it is unclear whether Ecuadorean tribunal will hear the case, and there is no
generally codified Ecuadorean legal remedy for the unjust enrichment and tort claims
asserted." Piper Aircrqft, 454 U.S. at 255 n.22.
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examination of the adequate alternative forum requirement, he found a
statistically significant correlation between findings of inadequacy and low
scores for rule of law and control of corruption.27 Ecuador scores poorly in
World Bank indicators for rule of law and control of corruption, the scores on
which Lii's study relied.2 8 For years, Ecuador's judicial system has been the
subject of concerns about corruption.2 9
In the Chevron litigation, although the U.S. district court granted dismissal
on grounds of forum non conveniens and this ruling was ultimately upheld on
appeal,3 ° the courts took seriously the argument that Ecuadorian courts might
lack the integrity to qualify as an adequate alternative forum. The Southern
District of New York deferred ruling on the forum non conveniens motion to
give the plaintiffs an opportunity to pursue their argument that the courts of
Ecuador were insufficiently independent and impartial to provide due
process. 31 The district judge ordered supplemental briefing on this question and
then made detailed findings, finding the Ecuadorian judicial system an
adequate alternative forum, which the Second Circuit found was not an abuse
of discretion.
32
After the litigation in Ecuador reached judgment, serious questions
emerged about the integrity of the Ecuadorian judicial process in the case. An
international arbitration panel ordered the Republic of Ecuador "to take all
measures at its disposal to suspend or cause to be suspended the enforcement or
recognition within and without Ecuador" of the judgment against Chevron.33
The Southern District of New York found significant evidence of problems,
27. Michael T. Lii, An Empirical Examination of the Adequate Alternative Forum in
the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 513, 542 (2009).
28. Worldwide Governance Indicators, Country Data Report for Ecuador 1996-2011,
WORLD BANK, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c66.pdf (last visited Dec. 18,
2012).
29. See, e.g., Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311-14 (1lth Cir. 2001);
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES,
ECUADOR 1 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/1 86722.pdf
(reporting that "[c]orruption was endemic, especially in the judicial sector, and officials
engaged in corrupt practices with impunity," and referring to "corruption and denial of due
process within the judicial system" and "a dysfunctional judiciary"); Edgardo Buscaglia, An
Economic and Jurimetric Analysis of Qfficial Corruption in the Courts: A Governance-
Based Approach, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME,
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/cicpl2.pdf (2001) (measuring variables to
explain corrupt judicial practices in Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela).
30. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 476 (2d Cir. 2002).
31. Id. at 475 ("The district court deferred ruling on Texaco's motion to dismiss 'in
order to give plaintiffs the chance to reopen an issue they had previously abandoned, i.e.,
whether the courts of Ecuador (and/or) Peru are sufficiently independent and impartial to
provide' due process.").
32. Id. (citing Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 544-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
33. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 886 F. Supp. 2d 235, 248 (2012).
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finding among other things that "uncontradicted evidence demonstrates that the
report and subsequent responses filed in [the independent expert's] name were
tainted by fraud.",34 That court recently stated that "Chevron has established at
least probable cause to believe there was fraud or other criminal activity in the
procurement of the Judgment and in other respects relating to the Lago Agrio
litigation in which that Judgment was rendered., 35 Specifically, the court found
at least probable cause to suspect that representatives of the plaintiffs "bribed
the Ecuadorian judge to obtain the result they wanted and, as part of the deal,
wrote the Judgment to which the judge put his name," that they "coerced the
then-presiding Ecuadorian judge to terminate judicial inspections" and to
appoint their candidate as evaluator, and that the supposedly independent
expert report "was planned and written, at least in major part and quite possibly
entirely, by lawyers and consultants retained on behalf of the [plaintiffs] though
it was signed by Cabrera and filed as if it were his independent work.",3 6 These
are serious charges, and if correct, constitute reasons not to enforce the
judgment. But should they make us rethink the propriety of the forum non
conveniens dismissal?
The concerns that emerged about the integrity of the Ecuadorian judicial
process in the Chevron litigation naturally lead to second-guessing the forum
non conveniens dismissal. If the U.S. court had found Ecuador an inadequate
forum to begin with, then the subsequent problems could have been avoided.
Years of bitterly fought enforcement proceedings and international discovery
disputes, accompanied by massive legal expenses, might have been largely
avoided had that early decision gone differently. One is tempted to say, in light
of how things played out, that the federal court in New York ought not to have
dismissed the case. But just because the litigation played out in a way that
raises questions about the integrity of the foreign process, it does not mean that
the forum non conveniens motion should have been denied in the first place.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens asks whether, notwithstanding that
the plaintiffs' chosen forum possesses the power to adjudicate, a particular
34. Id. at 289; see also id. at 290 ("Certainly the uncontradicted evidence relating to
the Cabrera report and its relationship to the Judgment is disturbing."); id. at 292 ("As the
foregoing demonstrates, the LAPs' procurement of the termination of judicial inspections,
the adoption of the global assessment, and the appointment of Cabrera all unquestionably
were tainted. The secret participation of the LAP team in Cabrera's activities and its secret
drafting of the bulk of Cabrera's report were tainted as well. Moreover, there are serious
questions concerning the preparation of the Judgment itself in view of the identity between
some portions of the Judgment and the Unfiled Fusion Memo, especially in light of the
undisputed pattern of ex parte advocacy in the Lago Agrio litigation and the undisputed
instance of the LAP team's coercion of and duress on one of the judges to obtain a desired
result.").
35. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK), 2013 WL 1087236, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2013).
36. Id.
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dispute more appropriately belongs in another country's legal system. Despite
the sound of its name,37 the doctrine of forum non conveniens is best
understood not primarily as a doctrine of convenience but rather as a doctrine
of allocation of adjudicatory authority.3 8 Early descriptions of the doctrine
focused on whether the plaintiff's chosen forum was deliberately inconvenient
for the defendant, 39 but the developed doctrine has more to do with allocation
of power.40 The question is whether the chosen forum is inappropriate;
inconvenience is one aspect of inappropriateness. Any notion that the doctrine
is primarily about convenience is belied by the fact that its users frequently
argue in favor of the forum that is less convenient for themselves. 4 1 In Piper
Aircraft, the families of the Scottish air crash victims sued in the United States,
and the Unites States manufacturers sought dismissal in favor of a Scottish
forum.4 2 In the Chevron-Ecuador dispute, Ecuadorian plaintiffs sued in the
United States, and the United States oil company sought dismissal in favor of
an Ecuadorian forum.43 In these cases and many others, no party used the
doctrine of forum non conveniens to advance its own convenience. Rather,
37. Forum non conveniens sounds as if it should translate from Latin to English as
"inconvenient forum," and indeed this is how some translate it. See, e.g., ALM LEGAL
DICTIONARY, http://dictionaiy.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=779 (last accessed May 28,
2013) (defining forum non conveniens as "Latin for a forum which is not convenient"). But
the Latin conveniens, a participle of convenire, denotes coming together, suitability, or
agreement. See NOTRE DAME LATIN DICTIONARY, http://www.archives.nd.edu/cgi-
bin/lookup.pl?stem conven&ending=iens (last accessed May 28, 2013). Even as a matter of
translation, the phrase forum non conveniens should invoke notions of suitability broader
than mere inconvenience.
38. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 12, at 1453 ("The forum non conveniens
doctrine provides guidelines for allocating adjudicative authority between countries [in cases
where more than one country's courts are available]."); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.
454 U.S. 235, 260-61 (1981) (describing Scotland's "very strong interest in this litigation"
and concluding that "[t]he American interest in this accident is simply not sufficient to
justify the enormous commitment of judicial time and resources that would inevitably be
required if the case were to be tried here."); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509
(1947) (noting the "local interest in having localized controversies decided at home"); Allan
R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA.
L. REv. 781, 786 (1985) (recommending "decreased reliance on forum non conveniens as a
means of allocating political authority").
39. See Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 507-08; see also Whytock & Robertson, supra
note 12, at 1454 (citing early statements of the doctrine that emphasized inconvenience and
vexatiousness).
40. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 12, at 1454.
41. See Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens
in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28
TEX. INT'L L.J. 501, 525 (1993) ("I dismiss objections grounded in general 'convenience'
claims that all parties raise in these cases. Ironically, the foreign plaintiff claims that the
United States is the more 'convenient' place to litigate, while the United States defendant
argues for the foreign forum.").
42. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. 235.
43. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
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each sought a strategic advantage through forum selection. 44 The job for the
court, in deciding the forum non conveniens motion, is to decide whether the
plaintiffs chosen forum is inappropriate as a matter of allocating adjudicatory
responsibility.
If a dispute, in this sense, belongs in a foreign judicial system, but there are
questions about the integrity of that foreign judicial system, is it better to
protect against the risk of corrupt adjudication by denying forum non
conveniens dismissal on the grounds that the foreign system is not an adequate
alternative forum? Or is it better to dismiss the action, provide the foreign
judicial system the opportunity to proceed with adjudicating the dispute if the
plaintiffs refile there, and reserve for later the question of whether enforcement
of a resulting judgment may be resisted on account of corruption?
Putting the question in terms of the Chevron-Ecuador litigation, did the
United States court act properly by dismissing the case notwithstanding
concerns about the Ecuadorian court system? There were sound reasons for the
court to conclude that a dispute over environmental harms in the Oriente
region, as a matter of allocation of adjudicatory responsibility, belonged in
Ecuador. The dispute centered on allegations of harm to Ecuador's
environment and resulting harms to Ecuadorian citizens. It implicated questions
not only of protection of the Ecuadorian environment but also of the Republic
of Ecuador's control over its natural resources. The Southern District of New
York's determination that the forum non conveniens factors pointed to Ecuador
seems eminently reasonable. 45 But questions were raised about the integrity of
the Ecuadorian judicial system at the time of the forum non conveniens motion.
After a court grants a forum non conveniens dismissal, is there something
incongruous about later refusing to enforce an Ecuadorian judgment if evidence
emerges concerning fraud or corruption?
I suggest that the best course, ex ante, is for the United States court to
dismiss the case on grounds of forum non conveniens, notwithstanding
questions about the foreign court system. If it turns out that the subsequent
litigation in the foreign country is tainted by fraud or corruption, then the
judgment may be challenged, ex post, in enforcement proceedings. In other
words, it makes sense to maintain a low threshold for the adequacy of the
alternative forum for purposes of forum non conveniens, 46 even as we permit
challenges to the recognition of judgments on grounds of fraud and
44. See Silberman, supra note 41, at 525 ("In reality, plaintiffs engage in forum
shopping and defendants engage in reverse forum shopping, each seeking to turn to their
own advantage the laws and procedures in the respective forums.").
45. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
46. A low threshold is consistent with the Supreme Court's statement of the
requirement, see Piper Aircrqft, 454 U.S. at 255 n.22, as well as with the general treatment
by United States courts. See Fromherz, supra note 20, at 532 ("[U]nless the alternative
forum is truly horrendous, it will clear this hurdle.").
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corruption.
4 7
Christopher Whytock and Cassandra Robertson, in their article Forum Non
Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments,4 8 offer a potential
solution to the incongruity of refusals to enforce corrupt judgments after the
foreign jurisdiction was declared an adequate alternative forum. Focusing on
systemic as opposed to case-specific challenges, they point out the
inconsistency between the adequacy standard for forum non conveniens and the
adequacy standard for enforcement of a judgment. Whytock and Robertson
propose that the forum non conveniens adequacy standard should be raised to
match the standard for enforcement. If this were achieved, they argue, then
defendants who seek dismissal under forum non conveniens could be estopped
from arguing systemic inadequacy when a plaintiff later attempts to enforce a
judgment.
I view the problem differently, at least insofar as the forum non conveniens
standard is concerned. There is an important distinction between the ex ante
perspective of forum non conveniens and the ex post perspective of judgment
enforcement. As Ronald Brand puts it, "What is appropriate in determining the
most appropriate forum for the initial trial in the case is one matter. What is
appropriate in determining whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, that
forum's decision should be given full faith and credit is something very
different." 4 9 Although challenges to the recognition of judgments may relate to
either systemic inadequacy or case-specific problems of fraud or corruption,
they entail a backwards look that differs from the determination of facial
adequacy on a forum non conveniens inquiry.
Ex ante determinations of inadequacy are not only difficult as a practical
matter, but also problematic as a matter of deference to the varied legal systems
of the world. If private and public interest factors favor the foreign forum - that
is, if the evidence is in the foreign country and if the foreign country and its
citizens have the greatest interest in the dispute - then the dispute is sensibly
allocated to that country's courts as a matter of adjudicatory responsibility.
When a dispute belongs to another country in this sense, it is troubling for a
United States judge to say that the foreign country's dispute resolution system,
47. The Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, as revised in
2005, permits discretionary non-recognition of a foreign judgment if "the judgment was
obtained by fraud that deprived the losing party of an adequate opportunity to present its
case." UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4 (c)( 2 ) (2005). The
original 1962 Recognition Act also permitted discretionary denial of recognition for
judgments "obtained by fraud." UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT §
4(b)(2). See RONALD A. BRAND, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
20-21 (2012); see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895) (naming "fraud in
procuring the judgment" as a possible basis for nonrecognition).
48. 111 COLUM. L. REv. 1444 (2011).
49. Ronald A. Brand, Access-to-Justice Analysis on a Due Process Plaform, 112
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 76, 81 (2012).
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which resolves the disputes that arise in that country week after week, is not
good enough.
To avoid this sort of paternalism, the standard of adequacy for forum non
conveniens ought to be low. If the country has a functioning court system that
is empowered to hear the dispute, and if the defendants can be sued there,
50
then it should be rare for a court to find the forum inadequate. Not every legal
system looks like that of the United States - indeed, for better or for worse, the
U.S. legal system is exceptional in more ways than one can count - but
difference and even flat-out inferiority should not be a basis for denying foreign
legal systems the opportunity to adjudicate disputes of primary interest to their
own citizens. The test is not whether we feel comfortable with the forum, or
whether its courts resemble our own.
51
In the context of an Alien Tort Statute52 ("ATS") lawsuit arising out of
conduct in Nigeria, the Supreme Court recently emphasized that United States
courts are not the world's moral guardians. 53 Chief Justice Roberts, treating the
case as an application of the presumption against extraterritoriality, drove home
this point: "[T]here is no indication that the ATS was passed to make the
United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement of international
norms." 54 As Justice Story put it, 'No nation has ever yet pretended to be the
custos morum of the whole world ' 55 Justice Breyer, concurring, would leave
more room for ATS jurisdiction in cases implicating United States parties or
interests, even if the conduct occurred abroad.5 6 Interestingly, however, he
50. If there is any question about the timeliness of the suit or about a defendant's
amenability to personal jurisdiction, the defendant should be expected to waive these
defenses as a condition for a forum non conveniens dismissal. In the Ecuador litigation, the
Second Circuit initially vacated the forum non conveniens dismissal and remanded to the
Southern District of New York because dismissal was improper "absent a commitment by
Texaco to submit to the jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian courts." Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d
153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998). After Texaco consented to personal jurisdiction and waived statute
of limitations defenses, the district court granted the renewed motion to dismiss, and the
Second Circuit affirmed. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 475 (2d Cir. 2002).
51. For an example of a finding of adequacy despite significant deviations from
procedural fairness standards that would prevail in the United States, see UNC Lear
Services, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 581 F.3d 210, 220 (5th Cir. 2009) ("Experts from
both parties agreed that the [Saudi Arabian Board of Grievances] does not give full weight to
testimony given by women and non-Muslims, and considers testimony of Saudi nationals to
be more credible than non-nationals. Despite these concerns, the district court did not find
that the Board was an inadequate forum, and proceeded to the next step of the forum non
conveniens analysis.").
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
53. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
54. Id., at 1668 (quoting United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847
(C.C. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring) (declining to invoke the presumption against
extraterritoriality).
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defends his position by quoting the very same passage from Justice Story: "I
would interpret the statute as providing jurisdiction only where distinct
American interests are at issue. Doing so reflects the fact that Congress adopted
the present statute at a time when, as Justice Story put it, 'No nation ha[d] ever
yet pretended to be the custos morum of the whole world.' 57 The majority and
concurrence take different views on the relevance of a defendant's United
States citizenship for purposes of ATS jurisdiction, but they share the view that
it is not the role of the courts of the United States to be the justice-dispensers of
the world. Moreover, even for cases in which he would find that United States
courts have jurisdiction under the ATS, Justice Breyer points out the
importance of forum non conveniens as a back-up doctrine to minimize
international friction.
58
In our increasingly interdependent world, to what extent should the courts
of the United States rule the globe? The doctrine of forum non conveniens
provides a means for courts to exercise a modicum of humility, to defer to other
legal systems in appropriate cases. On this issue, we must be careful not to take
the wrong lesson from the Chevron-Ecuador dispute. From the outset, there
were fears that Ecuador's courts were vulnerable to corruption, and it seems
that those fears may have been well-founded even if they played out differently
than the parties expected. This may well provide a sound basis on which to
resist enforcement of the resulting judgment. But at its core, this was an
Ecuadorian dispute. The courts of Ecuador were entitled to a shot at resolving
it, and United States courts should be loath to label a foreign legal system
facially inadequate to handle disputes that most appropriately belong in that
country's courts.
57. Id. at 1673
58. Id. at 1674, 1677.
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